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INTERNATIONAL ADOPTION: THE HUMAN RIGHTS POSITION 
 
by Elizabeth Bartholet
* 
 
This is the pre-peer-reviewed version of the article “International Adoption, The Human Rights 
Position,” which will be published in final form in Global Policy, Issue 1, January, 2010. 
 
   Abstract 
 
International adoption is under siege, with the number of children placed dropping each of the 
last several years, and many countries imposing severe new restrictions. Key forces mounting 
the attack claim the child human rights mantle, arguing that such adoption denies heritage 
rights, and often involves abusive practices.  Many nations assert rights to hold onto the children 
born within their borders, and others support these demands citing subsidiarity principles.  But 
children’s most basic human rights, at the heart of the true meaning of subsidiarity, are to grow 
up in the families that will often be found only in international adoption.  These rights should 
trump any conflicting state sovereignty claims. 
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I. Introduction 
 
 
I flew from Boston, Massachusetts, to Lima, Peru, in 1985 to adopt the four-month-old who 
became Christopher, and flew back in 1987 to adopt the one-month-old who became Michael.  I 
counted myself from the first moments they were put into my arms as extraordinarily lucky to be 
their parent.   
 
But I still wondered at the policies that made it so hard to adopt.  I spent three months in Lima 
for each adoption, enduring the most challenging experiences of my life.  I nursed each child 
through terrifying illnesses, and agonized through endless sessions with police, social workers 
and courts.  I fought off mysterious threats to remove the children who had become mine in 
every way except the law, threats that hung over us until the day we flew home.   
 
I realized then that only a tiny fraction of those who might want to adopt a child from Peru 
would be able to.  Few would have the kind of job I did, allowing an extended leave.  Few would 
be able to deal with all the other difficulties of accomplishing a Peruvian adoption.  
 
I also began to learn how many children needed parents.  Daily I would hear about those newly 
orphaned by the Shining Path terrorists.  On visits to an orphanage, I saw babies crowding the 
nurseries, toddlers and older kids playing and fighting in the bleak yard, with its broken tricycles 
and swings.  No system seemed to exist for terminating parental rights so children could be 
adopted, yet few of these children ever received a visit from a parent or other relative.  The city’s 
child welfare agency regularly told those who inquired about adoption that there were no  
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children available. 
 
I have spent much of the 25 years since these adoptions studying the needs of unparented 
children worldwide, and the role of international adoption.  This has simply intensified my initial 
conviction that there is something terribly wrong with policies that lock children into 
orphanages, away from prospective parents. 
 
For a period during this time, some more adoption-friendly policies developed.  The Hague 
Convention on Intercountry Adoption was promulgated, preferring such adoption to in-country 
foster and institutional care (Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect 
of Intercountry Adoption, 1993; Bartholet, 2007b, pp. 172-77).  The numbers of international 
adoptions rose, reaching up to 45,000 worldwide (Selman, 2009; Paulsen & Merighi, 2009, p. 3).  
Some countries which had not allowed their children to be placed abroad opened up, including 
Russia, China, and countries in Eastern Europe and Africa.  Adoption became less stigmatized, 
so that more people chose it as a way of having children.   
 
However now the world has reversed direction.  The numbers of international adoptions have 
dropped dramatically.  Many countries that had newly begun placing children abroad have closed 
again.  Many have instituted restrictions requiring that children be held for long periods to 
explore in-country placement options, before any placement abroad.  It is now almost unheard of 
for children to be placed internationally as the young infants that Christopher and Michael were.  
Indeed it is extremely rare for children under the age of one to be placed.  Yet all familiar with  
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developmental psychology and social science research know that keeping infants in institutional 
care for more than a few months puts them at enormous risk for lifelong damage, even if they are 
ultimately adopted, with the risk increased proportionately with the length of stay (Bartholet, 
2007a, pp. 346-48). 
 
The organizations leading the attack on international adoption describe themselves as child 
human rights organizations.  But human rights activism in its institutionalized form has often 
played a perverse role (Kennedy, 2004).  Children’s most fundamental human rights are to be 
raised in the families that are often available only internationally.  
 
II. The Crisis in International Adoption 
 
A. International Adoption Under Siege 
 
UNICEF and many other international children’s organizations promote the idea that unparented 
children should be kept at almost all costs in their country of origin.  While UNICEF agrees in 
principle that children should not be institutionalized, it presses for the development of 
alternatives to international adoption – support for poor parents, foster care, and in-country 
adoption.  UNICEF says that it is not entirely opposed to international adoption, but clearly 
wants to limit it to last-resort status.  As international adoptions began to expand, UNICEF 
focused increasingly on its alleged problems, claiming that adoption abuses involving baby 
buying, fraud, and kidnapping were widespread.  And UNICEF has called increasingly for policy  
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changes designed to limit international adoption (Bartholet, 2007b, pp. 154-57). 
 
In many ‘sending countries’ national pride has led to calls to stop selling, or giving away, ‘our 
most precious resources,’ and to claims that the country should ‘take care of our own.’  
‘Receiving countries’ have been responsive to these attacks (Bartholet, 2007b, p. 167).  They 
have nothing to gain and much to lose if they look like they are taking children from unwilling 
countries, or tolerating adoption abuses.   
 
The media reflect and exacerbate the hostility to international adoption, featuring stories of baby 
buying and kidnapping.  One article receiving extensive media coverage, ‘The Lie We Love,’ 
rejects the ‘myth’ that such adoption provides homes to children in need, claiming that there are 
virtually no unparented young children, and that adoption abroad results in ‘babies in many 
countries ... being systematically bought, coerced, and stolen away from their birth families’ 
(Graff, 2008, p. 60).
i 
 
B. Impact of the Attacks on International Adoption 
 
These attacks have had an impact.  After six decades of steadily rising, international adoptions 
into the U.S., the world’s major receiving country, have been down each year since the 2004 
peak of 22,884 (U.S. Department of State, 2008; Bartholet, 2007b, pp. 158-59).  Some project 
that by 2010 the number will fall to less than half that number (DiFilipo, 2009). Worldwide, such 
adoptions are dropping at a similar rate.  
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Several countries known for horrendous orphanage conditions, or huge orphanage populations, 
have closed down or severely limited international adoption.  Romania’s orphanages were 
brought to the world’s consciousness at the time of former dictator Ceausescu’s fall.  Seasoned 
journalists were in tears as they reported on children tied to their cribs, children who had never 
learned to walk or talk because they had lived in their cribs without any human interaction, 
children dying from AIDS contracted in the orphanage.  Post-Ceausescu, international adoption 
placed thousands of Romanian children per year for several years.  But Romania recently 
legislated an end to such adoption, in response to demands they do so in order to join the 
European Union (Bartholet, 2007b, pp. 161-63).  Russia, with huge numbers of institutionalized 
children, instituted a requirement that children be held six months prior to placement abroad, 
despite the limited number of in-country homes.  China instituted new rules limiting the 
eligibility of international adoptive parents, claiming there was no longer much need for foreign 
adoptive homes, despite the millions of abandoned baby girls (Bartholet, 2007b, pp. 160-61). 
 
Several countries that used to release significant numbers of children as early infants, have shut 
down or severely restricted international adoption.  Guatemala was one of the major sending 
countries, despite its small size, placing many children at 4-6 months of age, with excellent 
prospects for healthy development.  Then UNICEF and others called for a moratorium, based on 
alleged adoption abuses.  Guatemala is now closed, with any future international adoption 
system likely to be very limited (Bartholet, 2007b, pp. 156-57, 190-91).  
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C. Positions Taken by International Adoption Critics 
 
Some argue that international adoption is an inherent violation of human rights, depriving 
children of their heritage birthright.  Andrew Bainham took this position as academic adviser to 
the European Parliament in connection with Romania’s admission to the Union, arguing that 
international adoption violated heritage rights under international law (Bainham, 2003).  David 
Smolin, another academic critic, argues that international adoption is inherently exploitative, 
because poverty leads many birth parents to surrender their children (Smolin, 2004). 
 
UNICEF makes a point of saying, at least publicly, that it is not entirely against such adoption.  
Along with most other critics, UNICEF focuses on adoption abuses, and argues for regulatory 
‘reform’ to ensure against baby buying and fraud, and provide preferences for in-country 
placement.  
 
However UNICEF actions and policies reveal that it sees almost no legitimate role for 
international adoption.  One UNICEF policy paper targets any country placing significant 
numbers of children abroad as a problem, requiring adoption reform (Bartholet, 2007b, pp. 154-
57).   
 
Dozens of self-styled child human rights organizations opposed Madonna’s two adoptions from 
Malawi, although there was no alternative for the children involved except continued life in an 
orphanage.  Sixty-seven such organizations filed amicus briefs in court opposing the first  
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adoption.  The Human Rights Consultative Committee, a network of 85 such organizations, 
issued a statement opposing the second adoption, arguing that under the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, institutional care was preferred to international adoption (Pound Pup 
Legacy, 2009).  The high profile Save the Children also opposed this adoption. 
 
Moreover UNICEF and other critics have pushed for policies which would effectively eliminate 
international adoption.  They call for closing down adoption programs in response to alleged 
abuses.  They call for eliminating the private intermediaries that are in many countries the 
lifeblood of adoption.  They argue that international adoption must be ‘subsidiary’ to various in-
country options, regardless of whether those options exist.  Thus UNICEF’s official position is 
that international adoption should be considered only after in-country adoption and ‘permanent’ 
family or foster care are found unavailable.  And many argue that children should be held for six 
months or longer while in-country solutions are pursued. 
 
The Hague Conference on Private International Law issued a guide for interpreting the Hague 
Convention on Intercountry Adoption, which endorses UNICEF’s claims that in-country 
‘permanent’ family or foster care should be preferred to international adoption (Guide to Good 
Practice, 2008, pp. 29-30).  Yet the Hague Convention had been generally understood to take an 
important step in the direction of validating international adoption by making it the preferred 
option over foster care.  
 
UNICEF and other international adoption critics also promote family preservation, family  
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reunification, and kinship care, as preferable to international adoption.  They want to create and 
expand social welfare support for poor families so that more children can be kept within the 
original kinship group. 
 
D. Threats to International Adoption and to Children 
If arguments that international adoption is inherently wrong prevail, such adoption would be 
eliminated.  However few press these arguments. 
 
The real threat to international adoption and to children is posed by UNICEF and others who 
claim they are not against international adoption, but simply for regulatory reform.  Arguments 
against ‘abuses,’ and for children’s heritage rights sound reasonable to many.  
 
But the UNICEF positions would if accepted radically limit children’s opportunities for finding 
nurturing homes.  Moratoria closing down international adoption programs in particular 
countries end such adoption entirely, and while moratoria are often initially described as 
temporary, they may end up being permanent.  Even if eventually lifted, children will meantime 
have been denied adoptive homes.  Thus in Guatemala, the current moratorium is denying homes 
to thousands per year.   
 
Regulation prohibiting private intermediaries has been the deathknell for international adoption 
in many countries, as those promoting this ‘reform’ well know.  Critics find receptive audiences 
with their talk of eliminating the greedy lawyers and others who make a living arranging such  
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adoption.  But private intermediaries are generally more eager than government bureaucrats to 
make matches between the parties who want adoption to happen – parties that include birth as 
well as adoptive parents (Myers, 2009, p. 782).  Pursuant to pressure from UNICEF and others, 
many countries in South and Central America have banned private intermediaries, and have as a 
result largely eliminated international adoption.  These countries include Paraguay, Chile, 
Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Honduras, and El Salvador.  Instead of placing thousands of children per 
year, they now place only a handful, and then only after the children have spent long periods in 
damaging orphanages.  Guatemala has responded to similar pressure by enacting legislation 
eliminating private intermediaries in any future international adoptions. 
 
Preferences for in-country solutions over international adoption deny or at best delay the good 
homes that are typically only available in such adoption.  There are limited prospects for 
adoption in the poor countries which predominate as sending countries.  Desperately poor people 
are generally not in a position to volunteer for parenting through adoption.  Poor countries are 
often devastated by war, disease, and related chaotic conditions which make adoption 
additionally unlikely.  Many Asian countries are characterized by a powerful bias for blood-
linked parenting which discourages adoption.  Many sending countries contain minority race 
groups which suffer severe discrimination, making it hard to place the group’s children with 
more privileged groups within these countries. It is the relatively wealthy countries of the 
western world that have large numbers of eager prospective adoptive parents. 
 
A six-month holding period for in-country adoptive home searches, when there are few in- 
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country homes available, will thus generally at best delay placement.  This means condemning 
children who could have been placed internationally to live additional time in destructive 
orphanages.  And it reduces prospects for finding international homes, since it is always easier to 
place younger, less damaged children.   
 
Preferences for what UNICEF calls permanent family or foster care are similarly dangerous.  
UNICEF’s argument is that such care could preserve children’s birth and national heritage links.  
But foster care doesn’t exist as a meaningful option in most sending countries – unparented 
children are instead relegated to orphanages.  UNICEF wants foster care expanded, but denying 
children adoptive homes now because in the future foster care might exist is unfair to existing 
children.  Nor is there any reason to believe that poor countries will be able to build a nurturing 
permanent foster care system.  Such foster care as now exists in poor countries is often quite 
terrible, ‘a euphemism for cottage-industry-level institutionalization, ... parentless children in a 
small-scale orphanage run by a small staff of under-resourced adults’ (Wardle, 2005, p. 341).  
Foster care in the U.S., with all its resources, is notorious for bouncing children from one home 
to another.  While critics of international adoption talk of building foster care far superior to that 
in the U.S., they fail to explain how this could be accomplished.  Existing social science 
evidence indicates that foster care would not serve children’s interests nearly as well as 
international adoption (Bartholet, 1999, pp. 96-97).  
 
Positions favoring family preservation, family reunification, and kinship care over international 
adoption are similarly dangerous.  It will be a long time before the poor countries at issue create  
 
13
adequate welfare support, employment and other systems enabling parents to raise all the 
children they produce.  In today’s world, family preservation and reunification efforts will be 
necessarily limited.  Kin who have not already stepped forward are not likely to provide 
placements.  Children removed because of maltreatment are likely to do better in adoption than if 
reunified with their parents (Bartholet, 1999, pp. 81-110, 154-59, 176-204). 
 
We should of course work to improve social welfare systems in poor countries and, more 
broadly, to address the terrible poverty and chaos characterizing the lives of those whose 
children end up in institutions and on the streets.  But change, at best, will not happen in time to 
provide homes for the children now living in those institutions and on those streets.   
 
Nor is there evidence that denying children homes in international adoption helps solve the larger 
social problems at issue.  While there are no good studies systematically examining the results of 
recent moratoria, anecdotal evidence indicates that they may simply cause more suffering.  
Reports indicate drastic increases in the number of abandoned children, and ongoing horrendous 
conditions in orphanages, in Vietnam, Guatemala, and Romania in the wake of their moratoria 
(Center for Adoption Policy, 2009; Worthington, 2009, pp. 568-83).  An advertisement 
published by 33 NGOs denounced conditions in Romanian orphanages: 
 
Abandoned babies are often confined to steel cribs 23+ hours a day for months or years.  
Without normal stimuli, without the ability to crawl, play, interact or be loved, they suffer 
immense, often irreversible psychological and physical damage.  
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(Mitchell, 2009) 
 
If the critics of international adoption prevail, the results will be disastrous for the many tens of 
thousands of children who could be placed yearly.  Such adoption will be limited to last-resort 
status, with a relative handful of children released, and this only after damaging periods in 
orphanages.  
 
III. Why the International Adoption Critics Are Wrong 
 
A. Accepted Human Rights Principles Require that Children’s Best Interests Govern 
 
Core international human rights law proclaims that children’s best interests should be the guiding 
principle in matters related to children and adoption.  For example, Article 3 of the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (CRC) provides generally that ‘the best interest of the child shall be a 
primary consideration,’ and Article 21 provides that in adoption it shall be ‘the paramount 
consideration’.
ii  Article 1 of the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption provides that 
‘intercountry adoptions take place in the best interests of the child and with respect for his or her 
fundamental rights as recognized in international law.’  Courts in South Africa, India, and 
Malawi have concluded that the CRC and related international human rights law make children’s 
best interests determinative in cases involving international adoption.
iii  UNICEF and other 
critics of international adoption generally agree that children’s best interests should govern, and 
thus focus their criticism on claims that children are injured by adoption abuses and by the loss  
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of heritage rights involved in out-of-country placement.   
 
If we take seriously the proposition that children’s best interests must govern, there should be no 
dispute about how to resolve the central policy issues in international adoption. 
 
B. International Adoption Serves Children’s Most Basic Human Rights 
 
Human beings need parental care for a prolonged period to survive physically and to develop 
mentally and emotionally.  Even the best institutions fail to provide the kind of care that infants 
and young children need (Bartholet, 2007a, p. 346 and n. 25; 347-480). 
 
Key international laws proclaim the centrality of children’s human rights to grow up in a family.  
The CRC Preamble describes the family as ‘the natural environment for the growth and well-
being of ... children.’  The CRC and the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption include in 
their Preambles that ‘the child, for the full and harmonious development of his or her personality, 
should grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love and 
understanding....’ 
 
The CRC also provides that member states must give children who cannot be raised by their 
original parents adequate substitute care, and protect children against the conditions 
characteristic of institutional care.  It says that an unparented child ‘shall be entitled to special 
protection and assistance,’ ‘alternative care’ (Article 20), and ‘such protection and care as is  
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necessary for his or her well-being’ (Article 3).  It says that ‘every child has the inherent right to 
life,’ and to ‘survival and development’ (Article 6).  It grants children affirmative rights to 
health, a standard of living adequate for appropriate development, and education (Articles 24, 27, 
and 28).  It requires states to ‘protect the child from all forms of physical or mental violence, 
injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation’ (Article 19).  It 
provides that ‘no child shall be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment,’ nor ‘deprived of his or her liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily’ (Article 37).    
 
Accordingly, core human rights principles support the proposition that children have a right to be 
raised by parents who can provide true family care.  Unparented children have a right to be 
placed in international adoption if that is where homes are available.  They have a right to be 
liberated from the conditions characterizing orphanages, street life, and most foster care (Dillon, 
2003; Bartholet, 2007b; Wardle, 2005, pp. 353-60). 
 
Courts have recognized these principles in decisions involving international adoption.  Justice 
Bhagwati in a 1984 case in India found a right to international adoption despite the absence of 
statutory recognition of such adoption, relying on international human rights law and related 
provisions in the Indian Constitution. He reasoned: 
 
[C]hildren need special protection because of their tender age and physique, mental 
immaturity and incapacity to look after themselves.  That is why there is a growing 
realization in every part of the globe that children must be brought up in an atmosphere of  
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love and affection and under the tender care and attention of parents so that they may be 
able to attain full emotional intellectual and spiritual stability and maturity.... 
 
... Every child has a right to love and be loved and to grow up in an atmosphere of love 
and affection and of moral and material security and this is possible only if the child is 
brought up in a family.... [I]f for any reason it is not possible for the biological parents or 
other near relative to look after the child ..., the next best alternative would be to find 
adoptive parents.... 
 
... [I]f it is not possible to provide them in India decent family life where they can grow 
up under the loving care and attention of parents..., there is no reason why such children 
should not be allowed to be given in adoption to foreign parents. 
(Lakshmi Kant Pandey v. Union of India, 1984, pp. 474, 476) 
 
The Malawi High Court, in upholding Madonna’s first adoption despite the residence 
requirement read by some to forbid international adoption, also relied on international human 
rights law, both the CRC and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Children.  It 
granted her adoption of David Banda based on finding that Madonna offered the true home that 
was unavailable in Malawi: 
 
The reality of the situation in Malawi is that a lot of children are in dire situation of 
material deprivation characterized by poverty, lack of access to essential nutrition, lack of  
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access to education, lack of access to proper sanitation and lack of access to adequate 
health care.  This is the inescapable reality in Malawi as in most third world countries. 
And to argue that we will soon find adequate solutions for all our deprived children is to 
assert a shameless and insolent lie. 
 
The infant in the instant case was among our many materially deprived children whose 
only remaining parent was forced, because of his circumstances, to place him at an 
orphanage....  In seeking to adopt the infant the petitioners are not therefore in the way of 
any permanent domestic solution for the infant. 
(Adoption case No. 2, 2008, p. 16)      
 
The Malawi Supreme Court of Appeal granting Madonna’s second adoption, involving ‘Mercy’ 
James, relied on similar international human rights law: 
 
We do not think that under [Malawi law] inter country adoption is a last resort 
alternative.... [S]ince the case of infant CJ surfaced itself there has not been a single 
family in Malawi that has come forward to adopt infant CJ neither have there been any 
attempt by anybody to place infant CJ in a foster family.... [T]here are only two options.  
She can either stay in Kondanani Orphanage and have no family life at all or she can be 
adopted by the Appellant and grow in a family.... In our Judgment the welfare of infant 
CJ will be better taken care of by having her adopted by the foreign parent rather than for 
her to grow up in an orphanage where she will have no family life, no love and affection  
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of parents. (In Re: CJ A Female Infant, 2009, pp. 24-25) 
 
The Constitutional Court of South Africa stated in a 2007 decision by Justice Sachs approving an 
international adoption, that the CRC ‘seems to accept the notion that “[e]nsuring that a child 
grows up in a loving, permanent home is the ultimate form of care a country can bestow upon a 
child” even if that result is achieved through an inter-country adoption’ (A.D. & Another v. D.W. 
& Others, 2008, pp. 200). 
 
International adoption is about placing tens of thousands of infants and young children who need 
homes with people who want to provide them.  There are many millions of children worldwide 
who need homes because they have been orphaned, abandoned, or removed.  They are destined 
to live either in orphanages or on the streets if they are not adopted internationally.  Estimates 
indicate that there are 143 million orphaned children (Joint U.N. Programme, 2004, p. 7).  There 
are over 8 million living in orphanages (The Secretary-General, 2006, p. 16), and some 100 
million street children with no available caregivers (Mitchell, 2009; Bartholet, 2007b, pp. 182-
83).  
 
UNICEF and other critics of international adoption say that only a small percentage of orphanage 
children are true orphans in the sense that both parents are dead, arguing that only these should 
be considered appropriate for adoption.  But those whose parents are not dead have either been 
removed for maltreatment or abandoned.  The overwhelming majority have no meaningful 
relationship with their parents, and no likelihood of ever returning home.  It is in the interests of  
 
20
these children, and of the birth parents who love them, to be placed in adoption. 
 
UNICEF and others also say that most orphanage children are older and suffer disabilities, 
whereas prospective adopters prefer healthy infants.  But many infants are placed in orphanages.  
It is restrictive adoption policies and the conditions of orphanage life that produce so many older 
children with disabilities.  And while prospective adopters generally prefer healthy infants, many 
are interested in adopting older children with significant disabilities.  
 
At their peak in 2004, international adoptions reached up to 45,000.  This is a small number by 
comparison to those in need of homes.  But the homes make a huge difference for those placed.  
And the number could easily be multiplied many times if we developed policies facilitating 
rather than restricting placement.  Surveys show that significant percentages of adults in 
privileged countries are interested in adopting.  Some 9.9 million of ‘ever married’ women in the 
U.S. alone have considered adoption, and only one percent of these adopt in a given year 
(Wardle, 2005, pp. 345-46). 
 
The contrast between the homes international adoption offers, and orphanage or street life, is so 
extreme as to make unnecessary any debate as to what best serves children’s human rights.  Most 
orphanages are terrible places, where children learn not to cry because crying brings no response.  
A recent article describes a typical institution for children under three in Bulgaria: 
 
It is the smell that [first] assaults you – filthy nappies, unwashed babies, rotting flesh.   
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Then you are hit by the silence, an eerie, unnatural silence, the silence of babies who 
have given up hope of ever being consoled, cuddled or comforted.  It is the dreadful quiet 
of starving, neglected, unloved children waiting to die.... The children in this particular 
wing have no human contact.  They are fed lying on their backs, and have their nappies 
changed only when there happens to be a supply of new ones.  Not one single word is 
uttered to them, so none of them is able to talk.  This is how they live, and this is how 
they die....  These children are Europe’s guilty secret, hidden away from the world 
(Monckton, 2009). 
 
Studies document how destructive orphanage conditions are, even in the better orphanages, 
producing lifelong emotional and intellectual damage even for many of those children lucky 
enough to be eventually adopted.  Developmental psychologists explain how essential nurturing 
human interaction is for infants to develop normally.  The new science of early brain 
development demonstrates in dramatic color slides how differently the brains of children raised 
for two years in an orphanage look as compared to the brains of children raised with parents 
(Bartholet, 2007a, pp. 346-48).  The World Health Organization recommends that even ‘when 
high-quality institutions are used as an emergency measure ... the length of stay should be no 
more than 3 months’ (Browne et al., 2004, p. 11). 
 
Street children often die early, and those that live suffer maltreatment, disease, exploitation for 
sex, labor and child soldiering, and trafficking for sex and forced labor in other countries 
(Wardle, 2005, pp. 325-31).  International adoption provides the only hope for a loving and  
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nurturing home for most children in need, as discussed above.  And international adoption 
produces good homes that work well for children.  Studies show that those placed in early 
infancy do essentially as well as non-adopted children.  For children who have suffered terrible 
damage by virtue of wartime trauma or orphanage life, the studies show international adoption 
does much to overcome deficits, enabling many to live essentially normal lives. 
 
And the expenses for international adoption are paid by adoptive parents.  Neither sending nor 
receiving countries need divert significant resources to finance such adoption.  Sending countries 
are relieved of the costs of institutionalization for all those placed, freeing up resources to serve 
the needs of other children.  International adoption also produces significant additional resources 
for poor countries and their people.  Adoptive parents pay fees to agencies and orphanages, some 
of which go to improve orphanage conditions.  China charges an orphanage fee for each adoption 
of $3000-5000.  Given the 7900 children adopted into the U.S. from China in 2005, and 
assuming the minimum $3000 fee, this meant $23,700,000 to improve orphanage conditions 
(Bartholet, 2007b, 184-85). 
 
Some critics of international adoption have argued for a systematic tax on such adoption, 
charging adoptive parents an extra few thousand dollars per adoption to support family 
preservation in sending countries (Smolin, 2007, p. 445; King, 2009, pp. 464-65).  But this 
would limit the chances for children to get adoptive homes, since raising the price of adoption 
will deter potential adopters.  
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In any event, there is ample evidence that the experience of adopting children from other 
countries triggers significant voluntary contributions by individuals and agencies to improve 
conditions in sending countries, in the absence of any such tax.  And the exposure international 
adoption brings creates new consciousness about these countries’ problems more broadly, and 
thus the potential for a wide range of helpful action by individuals and governments (Bartholet, 
2007a, pp. 350-52). 
 
One example among thousands of the productive interaction between international adoption and 
broader reform, is the work of Dr. Jane Aronson, whose understanding of the problems suffered 
by orphanage children began with her work as a pediatrician for international adoptive families.  
Dr. Aronson has worked on her own and with one of her adoptive parents, Angelina Jolie, to 
develop and fund several organizations that serve the needs of more than 10,000 children 
worldwide, building foster care, and improving orphanage conditions.  Her ‘Orphan Rangers’ 
provides visits to orphanage children who would otherwise experience no loving human contact. 
(Worldwide Orphans Foundation, 2009; http://www.wwo.org).  
 
The Malawi Supreme Court that approved Madonna’s second adoption recognized the 
interaction between her two adoptions and the many millions she had donated to improve 
conditions for other poor children in Malawi.  It noted, in concluding that she satisfied Malawi’s 
residence requirement: 
 
[T]he Appellant is not a mere sojourner in this country but has a targeted long term  
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presence aimed at ameliorating the lives of more disadvantaged children in Malawi.... 
[S]he is not here only to adopt infant CJ but to also implement her long term ideas of 
investing in the improvement of more children’s lives with her projects in Malawi. In our 
view it is clear that ... [she] was at the time of this application resident in Malawi (In Re: 
CJ A Female Infant, 2009, p. 23). 
 
C. Adoption Abuses Don’t Justify Limiting International Adoption 
 
Adoption abuses exist, as in every area abuses of the legal system exist.  But there is no 
persuasive evidence that adoption abuses are extensive.  
 
Nor is there reason to think that they would be extensive.  Critics claim that adoption facilitators 
are wrongfully taking babies by paying money to induce birth parents to surrender their children, 
and even by kidnapping.  The sad truth is that even if there were many intermediaries capable of 
such crimes – and these are crimes everywhere – there is no real need to buy or kidnap children, 
since there are so many millions of desperate, impoverished birth parents incapable of caring for 
their children, and so many millions of orphaned and abandoned children.  Law reform oriented 
to facilitating lawful adoption would do much to reduce such adoption abuses as exist.  The 
Hague Conference Report providing the rationale for the Hague Convention on Intercountry 
Adoption made this very point, finding that then-existing difficulties created pressure for corrupt 
practices that would not exist in more effective systems for matching children with prospective 
parents (Hague Conference on Private International Law, 1990, p. 188).  
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Better enforcement of laws prohibiting adoption abuses is the obvious additional answer.  When 
parents violate laws prohibiting child maltreatment, we don’t shut down the system that sends 
newborns home with their parents.  We call for better enforcement of laws prohibiting 
maltreatment.  
 
International adoption critics argue that it is naive to think that adoption laws can be enforced in 
certain countries, given corruption and limited capacities for governance. But even if adoption 
abuses occur on more than an occasional basis, and even if eliminating them would be hard, 
shutting down international adoption is wrong. Zero tolerance for adoption abuses may sound 
good but it will hurt children.  The evils involved in such abuses must be weighed against the far 
more significant evils involved in denying children homes. 
 
The situation in Guatemala helps illustrate.  Claims that adoption intermediaries were giving 
birth mothers payments in connection with their surrender of babies helped shut down 
international adoption.  But there is no good evidence that these payments were used to induce 
mothers to give up children they would have kept but for the payment.  Instead it seems likely 
that given their desperate poverty and limited access to birth control, virtually all mothers given 
such payments would have surrendered regardless.  Payments for anything except expenses are 
illegal, and probably should be since it would be hard to know when any such payment 
influenced the surrender decision, and thus hard to draw the line between lawful payment and 
unlawful baby selling.  But there is no terrible evil in a poor birth parent who would in any event  
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surrender a child being given funds which will help her survive along with any other children she 
may have.  Shutting down international adoption programs in Guatemala deprives thousands of 
children per year of the chance to grow up in nurturing homes, rather than life-destroying 
orphanages.  That’s an evil that should count for more. 
 
Baby buying is generally not thought of as a serious evil in today’s world in other contexts.  
Commercial surrogacy is the institution in which true baby buying takes place systematically.  
Surrogacy contracts specify that the woman who provides pregnancy and childbirth services, and 
often her egg as well, will receive money in exchange for turning over the baby born, and 
terminating her parental rights.  Commercial surrogacy is flourishing in the United States and 
many other countries, and international commercial surrogacy is spreading rapidly, as those who 
want to become parents turn to poor countries for surrogates who will charge low prices.  Some 
of the countries which have shut down or significantly restricted international adoption are now 
engaged in the rapidly expanding international surrogacy business.  Private lawyers who used to 
arrange international adoption from Guatemala are now earning a living arranging for 
Guatemalan women to get pregnant in order to surrender for a fee their babies and their parenting 
rights.  India, which has significantly restricted international adoption, including by requiring 
that 50% of all adoptions be in-country (Dohle, 2008, p. 131), is engaged in a booming 
international surrogacy business, and is on the verge of regularizing it through facilitating 
legislation (Smerdon, 2008, p. 15; Gentleman, 2008).  Russia, which has also significantly 
restricted international adoption, is enthusiastically embracing international surrogacy (Lee, 
2009, p. 284).  UNICEF and other critics of baby buying in the international adoption context,  
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are interestingly silent about international surrogacy.       
 
C. Concepts of Nationalism and Heritage Don’t Justify Limiting International Adoption 
 
International adoption critics act as if the important rights at stake are those of national 
governments, and the often arbitrary lines separating countries are of overwhelming significance, 
marking each child as necessarily ‘belonging’ to the country of its birth. This translates into 
policy preferences for virtually all in-country options as compared to out-of-country adoption, 
and into mandatory holding periods which delay and often entirely deny such adoption. 
 
But children’s fundamental human rights to grow up in a nurturing family should trump nation 
state rights to hold onto children.  Moreover, keeping unparented children in their countries of 
origin does nothing to actually strengthen the economic and political situation of poor countries 
and their people.  It is simply a symbolic way for the powerless to stand up to the powerful, for 
countries formerly victimized by colonialism to make an anti-colonialist statement.  And it 
exploits the least powerful of all, the children of the poorest groups in these countries.  Ironically 
these are often the children of the indigenous groups which were the primary victims of 
colonialism, while often the rulers in countries that decide to hold onto these children in 
symbolic defiance of former colonial powers, are the descendants of the colonial invaders. 
 
International adoption critics say that they promote in-country solutions because this serves 
children’s heritage rights.  But this is retrograde thinking that ill-serves children’s real needs.   
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Children are not defined in some essentialist way by the particular geographical spot where they 
happened to be born.  Social science provides no basis for believing that children are better off if 
raised in their community of origin (Bartholet, 2007a, pp. 360-61).  Nor does common sense.  
Had Barack Obama been born in Kenya instead of in Kansas, would we view him as deprived of 
his Kenyan heritage by virtue of being raised in the U.S.?  Was he deprived of his Kansas 
heritage by virtue of being raised in Hawaii and, for a period, Indonesia?  Is he deprived or 
enriched by virtue of his complex national, racial and ethnic heritage?  His testimony, as 
revealed in books and speeches, indicates that he feels enriched, and empowered to act more 
effectively in all his public roles including his current presidency. 
  
We live in a world increasingly defined by globalization, with adults eager to cross national 
boundaries for economic and other opportunities.  Some 1.6 million per year immigrate to the 
U.S. alone, and immigrants constitute 12.5% of the total population in the U.S. 
 
In this world it would be laughable to argue that adults should be prevented from leaving their 
country of birth because of their heritage rights.  It would be thought outrageous for nations to 
lock adults behind walled boundaries because they constituted ‘precious resources.’  Heritage 
and state sovereignty claims can only be made in the context of international adoption because 
children are involved, and children are peculiarly incapable of protesting on their own behalf. 
 
If we truly mean to honor children’s rights, we must abandon such talk and treat children as 
members of the global community, entitled to have their most fundamental human rights  
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honored, wherever in the world that can best take place. 
 
It is understandable that UNICEF and others promote nation state rights to hold onto “their” 
children, and that many countries join in demanding these rights.  UNICEF was created in a post-
colonial era in which nationalism was an important value.  And countries that have emerged 
from a history of colonialist oppression, can easily see adoptions by foreigners as a modern 
version of colonialist exploitation. 
            
Also, international law pays tribute to the power of nation states over their children. Both the 
CRC and the Hague Convention allow countries to deny adoption altogether.  The CRC prefers 
in-country options that include foster and other ‘suitable’ care, over out-of-country adoption 
(Article 21(B)).  The Hague Convention prefers in-country to out-of-country adoption 
(Preamble; Article 4).  These ‘subsidiarity’ provisions defer to state sovereignty rights over their 
human child resources. 
 
Interestingly the first major international recognition of the rights of the child showed no such 
deference to state sovereignty, but made child rights truly primary.  In 1924 the League of 
Nations endorsed the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, providing: 
 
... [M]en and women of all nations, recognizing that mankind owes to the child the best 
that it has to give, declare and accept it as their duty that, beyond and above all 
considerations of race, nationality or creed:  
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I. The Child must be given the means requisite for its normal development, both 
materially and spiritually; 
II. The child that is hungry must be fed; the child that is sick must be helped; ... and the 
orphan and the waif must be sheltered and succoured; 
  III. The child must be the first to receive relief in times of distress;  
IV. The child must be put in a position to earn a livelihood and must be protected against 
every form of exploitation (Declaration of Geneva, 1924, p. 43). 
 
The CRC and Hague Convention subsidiarity provisions are understandable given that the 
Conventions represent agreements between nations.  But they are troubling, and they provide the 
primary basis for arguments that anti-international adoption positions are consistent with 
children’s human rights. 
 
However these subsidiarity provisions are inconsistent with the core principles endorsed in these 
same Conventions and elsewhere in human rights law, which make the child’s best interest 
primary, and proclaim the child’s right to grow up in a nurturing family fundamental.  
 
Several court decisions in international adoption cases have confronted this inconsistency, and 
concluded that the child’s best interests and right to family trump the subsidiarity provisions.  
Two South African decisions found that national regulations prohibiting out-of-country adoption 
violated international human rights law, as well as the South African Constitution’s endorsement 
of children’s rights, and accordingly approved the adoptions at issue (Minister of Welfare and  
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Population Development v. Fitzpatrick and Others, 2000; A.D. & Another v. D.W. & Others, 
2008).  They found that ‘the subsidiarity principle itself must be seen as subsidiary to the 
paramountcy principle,’ the principle making the child’s best interest paramount (A.D. & 
Another v. D.W. & Others, 2008, p. 204).
iv 
 
The Malawi decisions approving Madonna’s adoptions despite the residency requirement read by 
many to prohibit international adoption, found that residence had to be interpreted in light of the 
best interests principle, which it found trumped subsidiarity provisions under international 
human rights law.  In so ruling, the court in the second case, involving ‘Mercy,’ stated: 
 
Colonialism and colonial outposts in their original format are things of the past.  A new 
international legal order has taken root.  Globalization and the global village with all its 
legal ramifications is now what preoccupies legal minds….  Residence ... is no longer 
tied to the notion of permanence as a deciding factor.... It has for some time now been the 
law that a man may have more than one place in which he resides….  We do not think 
that under [Malawi law] inter country adoption is a last resort alternative.... [B]y her 
lifestyle [Madonna] is herself a child of the world.... (In Re: CJ A Female Infant, 2009, 
pp. 21, 24, 26). 
 
The original understanding of the subsidiarity principle has been perverted by those who use it to 
oppose international adoption.  Subsidiarity is designed to serve individual human rights not 
promote state sovereignty.  Subsidiarity principles require that children be brought up if possible  
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in their first and most intimate community, their family of origin, because the child’s most 
fundamental needs are served in a family community.  If children cannot be brought up in the 
family of origin, subsidiarity demands that they be placed in another family so they can enjoy 
that same sense of intimate community (Carozza, 2003, p. 38).   
 
The United States has in recent decades taken important steps to jettison old ideas that children 
belong in some essentialist way to their groups of origin.  The federal Multiethnic Placement 
Act
v rejected the idea that black children belonged to the black community, and so should be 
kept in black foster care or placed in black adoptive families, in preference to transracial 
placement.  The Act vindicates children’s rights to be placed in the earliest available permanent 
nurturing home, regardless of race.  The Adoption and Safe Families Act
vi rejected the idea that 
children necessarily belonged to their birth parents, regardless of fitness to parent.  The Act 
vindicates children’s rights to be raised in a permanent nurturing home, reducing the priority on 
family preservation and reunification, limiting time in foster care, and expediting adoptive 
placement.  There is also increasing support in the U.S. for the idea that children have a 
constitutional right to nurturing parenting, and thus to adoption when it represents the most 
likely route to such parenting (Woodhouse, 2005; Dwyer, 2009; In re John Doe and James Doe, 
2008). 
 
IV. The Way Forward: An International Adoption Policy Statement 
 
In the face of the current crisis in international adoption, leading human and child rights experts  
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have developed and endorsed a policy statement supporting the principle that children’s most 
basic rights are to grow up in the true family that is often available only in international adoption.  
It states that such adoption ‘should be an integral part of a comprehensive strategy to address the 
problems of unparented children.’  It recognizes such adoption as preferable to foster and 
institutional care, and rejects all holding periods in favor of placing children who cannot be 
raised by their birth parents as soon as possible, whether in or out of country.  It calls for 
addressing adoption abuses by enforcing and where needed strengthening laws governing 
misconduct, rather than eliminating private adoption intermediaries or otherwise restricting 
international adoption. 
 
This policy statement was endorsed as of June, 2009, by over 130 legal academics specializing in 
human and child rights, and by six child rights and adoption policy organizations 
(www.law.harvard.edu/programs/about/cap/).  The Human Rights Center of the powerful 
American Bar Association (ABA) developed a related resolution supporting international 
adoption which was formally adopted by the ABA in August, 2008.  These developments 
demonstrate that the organizations which have opposed international adoption using child rights 
rhetoric have no lock on the child human rights position.  
 
This policy statement is consistent with both the CRC and the Hague Convention, if those are 
interpreted to make central the child’s best interests and fundamental human rights.  It is 
consistent with the Hague Convention’s preference for in-country over out-of-country adoption: 
the statement simply provides that any such preference be implemented through a strategy which  
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does not result in delaying placement.  And the Hague Convention specifically allows for private 
intermediaries, so long as they operate under the aegis of a Central Authority. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Those who care about children should act now to preserve and promote international adoption.  It 
represents the best option for existing unparented children.  It serves the interests of birth parents 
who care about the children they cannot raise.  It brings new resources into poor sending 
countries to help improve conditions for the children left behind.  It represents the way forward 
to a world in which we recognize children as citizens of a global community with basic human 
rights entitlements, a world in which we recognize adults in that community as having 
responsibilities to all its members. 
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